The Concept of Neutrality Since the Adoption and Ratification of the Hague Neutrality Convention of 1907 by Guttman, Egon
American University International Law Review
Volume 14 | Issue 1 Article 2
1998
The Concept of Neutrality Since the Adoption and
Ratification of the Hague Neutrality Convention of
1907
Egon Guttman
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Guttman, Egon. "The Concept of Neutrality Since the Adoption and Ratification of the Hague Neutrality Convention of 1907."
American University International Law Review 14, no. 1 (1998): 55-60.
THE CONCEPT OF NEUTRALITY SINCE THE
ADOPTION AND RATIFICATION OF THE
HAGUE NEUTRALITY CONVENTION OF 1907
EGON GutrrrmAN
Your Excellencies, Members of the Diplomatic Corp, Fellow Aca-
demicians, Students, Ladies and Gentlemen ....
The purpose of this Conference is to review developments in the
concept of neutrality since the adoption and ratification of the Hague
Neutrality Convention of 1907. That Convention was clearly in-
tended merely to refer to military neutrality. Thus, Article VII states
that: "A neutral Power is not called upon to prevent the export or
transport, on behalf of one or other of the belligerents, of arms, mu-
nitions of war, or, in general, of anything which can be of use to any
army or fleet."2 Article IX goes on to indicate the concept of neu-
trality in requiring that: "Every measure of restriction or prohibition
taken by a neutral Power in regard to the matters referred to in Arti-
cle[I VII... must be impartially applied by it to both belligerents. " '
Two issues seem not to have been in the minds of the draftsper-
sons of this Convention: The effect of economic assistance and the
question of morality. First, I will address the effect of economic as-
sistance. Though a neutral Power could not itself act as a supplier of
war material, there was nothing to prevent nationals of a neutral
Power from doing so and thus to profit from such trade. Profit from
* Professor of Law, Washington College of Law. Levitt Memorial Trust
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1. Hague Convention V Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
and Persons in War on Land, Oct. 18. 1907. 36 Stat. 2310. 1 Bevans 654.
2. Id. art. VII, 36 Stat. at 2323, 1 Bevans at 662.
3. Id. art. IX, 36 Stat. at 2323-24, 1 Bevans at 663.
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belligerence was accepted and tolerated by this Convention. The
draftspersons did not seem to realize that the production of weapons
is a bilateral activity; one in which government and industry are
closely interlinked. The risk of exporting intellectual property in-
volved in the production of arms to the detriment of the nation re-
quires strict licensing. This clearly blurs the distinction between the
acts of a neutral government and that of its commercial entities.
Furthermore, the drafters did not recognize that economic assistance,
though not of any direct "use to an army or fleet," enables that army
or fleet to be supported in its belligerent activities.
Secondly, there is nothing in this Convention that seems to call
upon neutral Powers to consider moral issues in relation to economic
activities. Although a neutral Power must see that commercial enti-
ties and individuals in its realm observe restrictions, if any, placed by
it upon commercial activities, a strict reading of the terms of the
Convention does not seem to support any moral test. Thus, the Con-
vention does not seem to require that banks determine whether assets
deposited within them were obtained in violation of any precept of
international law or morality. Also, while referring to the treatment
of escaped prisoners of war, the Convention does not protect civil-
ians who may try to seek refuge in a neutral country because one of
the belligerents has determined to exterminate them. These are all
issues that during the 1940s could only be resolved on moral
grounds. Therefore, however effective this Convention may have
been considered to be in 1907, much has happened since them.
The circumstances surrounding World War II and the immensity
and horror of the atrocities committed by the Third Reich of Ger-
many differentiates this war from previous conflicts. The "normal"
wars of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were wars of aggran-
dizement; matters of succession or of territorial expansion or both.
In all of these the basis was an economic expansion, despite claims
to, and invocation of, divine favor made by all sides to the war. Mo-
rality was not an issue. Although the Thirty Years War was fought
along religious divides and resulted in a loss to Europe of approxi-
mately thirty percent of its population, mass murder and the elimina-
tion of an ethnic group was not its aim. Hitler changed all that. The
Holocaust was both method and intent. It sees itself reflected in the
policy of ethnic cleansing both in the former Yugoslavia and in cen-
tral Africa.
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Following these historical developments, the traditional concept of
neutrality as an accepted norm of international law requires recon-
sideration. This is especially so when one argues that neutral and
impartial conduct means not merely standing aside from active bel-
ligerence, but calls into question the maintenance of commercial and
financial relations with a regime that is conceded to be evil under the
moral precepts of counties claiming a "neutral" status. As Ambassa-
dor Scheffer only recently stated from this rostrum, "'Neutrality' in
the face of genocide is unacceptable and must never be used to crip-
ple or delay our collective response to genocide."'
Many countries are forced to re-examine their positions during the
Nazi Era in the light of questions raised by the world's conscience.
Examples of this re-examination are Argentina's Independent Com-
mission to "clarify the Nazi Role in Argentina," and the Swedish
Commission that is about to report on Sweden's role regarding the
assets used by Germany as payment for raw material, as well as
Sweden's general position as a "neutral" or "unaligned" nation dur-
ing World War II. A number of Swiss studies have exposed Swit-
zerland's banking and commercial dealings with Nazi Germany.
These financial dealings left Switzerland as a major creditor nation
of Nazi Germany despite the purchases of stolen gold by Swiss
banks to finance the Nazi war effort. These grants of huge lines of
credits allowed Germany to purchase war material and to launder
gold not only stolen from the national treasuries of conquered na-
tions, but also from innocent victims of genocide. Spain, Portugal,
Brazil, and other South American countries are also confronting the
issue of economic dealings with Nazi Germany, denying safe-haven
to Nazi victims and ultimately granting such safe-haven to partici-
pants in the Nazi atrocities.
This symposium seeks to address these issues. It focuses on inter-
national law, while acknowledging that such law is not hard science.
The aim of this conference is not merely to be an accurate and in-
sightful review but, if possible, to illuminate the outlines of a moral
aspect of international law.
Basically the question for international law is whether neutrality is
4. M. Cherif Bassiouni et al., War Crimes Tribunals: 7he Record and the
Prospects: Conference Convocation, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1383. 1395 (1998)
(statement of Ambassador David J. Scheffer).
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dependant solely on non-participation in belligerent activities or re-
quires that there be neither direct nor indirect assistance to a belliger-
ent-that there be no commercial transactions with such belligerents.
Is there not a moral duty on nations not to turn a blind eye on activi-
ties by a belligerent that evidence anti-humanitarian, genocidal en-
deavors? If we accept this approach, neutral Powers would no longer
be considered to have acted within the guidelines of international law
when they turn back civilians faced with certain extermination be-
cause of their ethnic or political backgrounds.
The concept of total war involving the destruction of civilian
population centers makes the traditional concept of neutrality no
longer acceptable. If we recognize that the traditional approach to
neutrality requires re-examination, then we must ask: What are we
going to put in its place? This raises the further question whether an
internal conflict not falling within the traditional international con-
cept of war, permits nations to stand aside despite violations of hu-
man rights by one of the parties. On the other side of this equation is
the question, can nations claim a neutral status in an "internal con-
flict," or must they await a determination by the United Nations Se-
curity Council ("UNSC") prohibiting direct or indirect assistance to
either side in a struggle?
International law is not Austinian in nature. There is no sovereign
who gives international law. International law is the law of nations,
and as such represents the accepted moral basis of what we would
like to call civilized nations. International law is the common de-
nominator of morality. If one accepts that international law is the
jure gentium-the generally accepted minimum morality among na-
tions-and it includes the jus cogens, then international conventions
are either the written embodiment of these accepted principles of in-
ternationally recognized concepts, or are binding because of the ac-
cepted norm of international law: Pacta sunt Servansa.
International concepts are not final, they are not immutable, nor
embodied in cement. An approach that may have been satisfactory
in 1907 may no longer reflect the view of the present time and may
no longer be fully acceptable. The world has moved away from ig-
noring evil to confronting evil. Thus, the traditional concept of neu-
trality may no longer be acceptable to nations. Therefore, we must
consider what to put in its stead. The Charter of the United Nations
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still clings to the traditional concepts of international law. Have we
only progressed to the point where we ask, what will the UNSC do?
Can we justify turning away refugees from our borders because they
have not yet been able to cross these borders? Is it only after they
have crossed these borders that the provisions of a convention that
governs the treatment of refugees can become effective? All of these
are questions that cry out for answers. We cannot expect to find
these answers in this one-day Conference, but if we can start thinking
about answers and can begin to discuss these issues, this Conference
will be a success.
I would like to add my welcome to that extended by our Dean,
Claudio Grossman. In particular I would like to welcome represen-
tatives of the Bergier Commission whose report most of us are anx-
iously awaiting. On one of our panels we have Mr. Michael Brad-
field who is associated with the Volker Commission. There are
various officials of the United States Department of State and De-
partment of Justice present, who have been working on what has be-
come known as the Eizenstat Report. We are hoping to receive the
final publication of this report.
We are honored to have representatives from Europe and South
America at this Conference. These distinguished scholars came spe-
cifically to Washington to participate in this Conference and we
would like to thank their respective governments for making their
presence here possible.
Our guests from Europe include: Professor Schindler, from Swit-
zerland; Ambassador-Professor Wahlbdck, from Sweden; Professor
da Costa Leite, from Portugal; and Professor Antonio Marquina,
from Spain. We have also been fortunate to be honored by His Ex-
cellency Ambassador Dr. Diego Guelar of Argentina and Rabbi
Henry Sobel of Brazil, who will join us in panel discussions.
We must note that speakers at this Conference are presenting their
personal points of view which may not necessarily reflect those of
the government with which they have a relationship.
I would like to thank the Dean of the Law School, Claudio Gross-
man, for having supported Ambassador-Professor Rubin and me in
preparing for this Conference. Our thanks also go to the Federal Bar
Association-International Law Section, The International Law Insti-
tute, represented by Professor Don Wallace of the Georgetown Law
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Center, The Washington Foreign Law Society, The International As-
sociation of Jewish Lawyers and Jurist-American Section, and B'nai
B'rith-Chesapeake Region, who have assisted us in allowing us to
use their mailing list.
